Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1949

Canada Dry Bottling Company of Utah and
McCullough Recreation Company v. Board of
Review, Industrial Commission of Utah,
Department of Employment Security : Brief of
Defendant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Attorneys for Defendant; Clinton D. Vernon; Fred F. Dremann;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Canada Dry Bottling Co v. Board of Review, Industrial Comm., No. 7389 (Utah Supreme Court, 1949).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1183

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
CANADA DRY BOTTLING COMPANY OF UTAH and McCULLOUGH RECREATION COMPANY, Utah corporations,
Plaintiffs}

vs.

Case No. 7389

BOARD OF REVIEW, INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY,

Defendant.

DEFENDANT'S

,
.

.

1'1111

F ~ ~ E D:;~

5
BRffi~-----c
.t fRt!p;j
11tE
·-·---.. __
RK, SUPREME

------

COURT. fJ~

'

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT:
CLINTON D. VERNON
Attorney General

FRED F. DREMANN, Special
Assistant Attorney General

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

r"liH

INDEX
Page
Statement of the Case______________________________________________________________ 3
Statement of Facts ----------------------------------------------------------------

4

DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT
Neither the Canada Dry Bottling Company of Utah, a Corporation, nor the McCullough Recreation Company, a
Corporation, Were t(Quali1'ied Employers" Within the
Meaning of the Utah Act on January 1, 1947, Since
Neither Acquired All or Substantially All the Assets of
the Predecessor Employer,· The R. Verne McCullough
Enterprises ----.. ---------------------------------------------------------------------

6

Conclusion ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 26
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Section 42-2a-7 (b) (2), Utah Code Annotated 1943------------

6

Section 42-2a-7 (b) ( 3) & ( 4), Utah Code Annotated 1943,
as amended by Chapter 56, Laws of Utah 1947--.------------ 6-7
Section 42-2a-7 (b) ( 3), Utah Code Annotated 1943, as
amended by Chapter 53, Laws of Utah 1949 ____________________

7

Section 42-2a-7 (c) Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended
by Chapter 56, Laws of Utah, 1947--------------------------------

8

Section 42-2a-7 (c), Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended
by Chapter 53, Laws of Utah, 1949------------------------------------ 11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Newspaper P.M., Inc., Marshall Field and Marshall Field,
Jr., individually, doing business as· Field Publications vs.
Edward Corsi, Industrial Commissioner (CCH N.Y.
Paragraph 8 520) ---------------------------------------------------------------· 12
Section 42-2a-19, Utah Code Annotated 1943---------------------- 13
C. A. Lund & Company ~s. Rolfe, 93 N. H. 280, 41 A.
( 2d) 226 ( 1945) --------·------------------------------------------------------- 15
Sulloway, et al vs. Rolfe, 47 A. ( 2d) 109 ( 1946) ---:------------- 15
Seavey Hardware Company vs. Riley, 95 N. H. ____ , 67 A.
( 2d) 430 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 16
The New York Employment Security Act____________________________ 18
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division 3r~ Department, 27 5, Appellate Division 881 ------------------------------------ 19
Hinzmann and Waldmann, Inc., Appellant vs. Edward
Corsi, Industrial Commissioner, 274 App. Div. 1009-------- 20
Auclair Transportation, Inc., vs. William Riley, Commissioner of Labor ( CCH N.H. 8084) ---------------------------------- 21
Iowa Statute ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 23
Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County (No. 2 Commonwealth Docket 1948) Commonwealth of Pennsylvania vs. Molnar Brothers Coal Company________________________ 25

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the Supreme Co~rt
of the State of Utah
CANADA DRY BOTTLING COMPANY OF UTAH and McCULL 0 U G H RECREATION COMPANY, Utah corporations,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No. 7389

BOARD OF REVIEW, INDUSTRIAL
COMMISS~ON OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY,
Defendant.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 28, 1948, a representative of. the Department
of Employment Security of the Industrial Commission of Utah,
issued a determination directed to the Canada Dry Bottling
Company of Utah, .Inc. holding that the Canada Dry Bottling
Company did not acquire all or substantially all of the assets
of the partnership, The R. Verne McCullough Enterprises,
and that, therefore, the said Canada Dry Bottling Company
3
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was not a "qualified employer" within the meaning of Section
·42-2a-7 (c) ( 1) (C), Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended
by Chapter 56,. Laws of Utah 1947.
On the same date a similar determination was addressed
to the McCullough Recreation Company. On November 4,
1948, formal appeals were filed in behalf of both the Canada
Dry Bottling Company corporation and the McCullough
Recreation Company corporation. The matter was duly heard
before the Appeals Referee, who rendered his decision on July
20, 1949. His decision upheld the determination of the representative.
On July 28, 1949, the decision of the Appeals Referee
was appealed to the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah under the provisions of Section 42-2a-10,
Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended by Chapter 53, Laws
of Utah, 1949. On the 17th day of August, 1949; the Board
of Review denied any further hearing and thereby sustained
the decision of the Appeals Referee and the representative.
The matter is now before this court by virtue of a Petition
for Writ of Review dated August 26, 1949.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The R. Verne McCullough Enterprises, a general partnership for more than three years prior to January 1, 1947, operated
the Canada Dry Bottling Company of Utah, the Temple Bowling Alleys, Ritz Bowling Palace, and Ogden Bowling Center.
Each of these operations had its separate records, bank accounts
and personnel. The profits, when determined, were deposited
4
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in a profit account in the general partnership, the R. Verne
McCullough Enterprises, for the purpose of distribution to
the partners.
On or about July 1, 1947, a Utah corporation known as
the McCullough Recreation Company was formed and to it
were transferred the operating assets of Temple Bowling Alleys,
Ritz Bowling Palace, and Ogden Bowling Center. The stockholders in the corporation were the partners of the general
partnership, the R. Verne McCullough Enterprises, ·and were
issued stock in the same amounts and proportions as were their
interests in the general partnership.
On or about July 1, 1947, a Utah corporation was organized under the name of Canada Dry Bottling, Company
of Utah. This corporation acquired all o~ the operating assets
of that part of the general partnership enterprise known as
the Canada Dry Bottling Company of Utah. Again, the stockholders of the corporation were the partners of the general
partnership, the R. Verne McCullough Enterprises, and held
stock in proportion to their previous partnership interests.
It may be admitted for all purposes of the question at issue
that the general partnership, the R. Verne McCullough Enterprises, discontinued operations as of the date of the transfer
to the corporations. The situation may be very simply stated
in that each of the corporations which were· formed on or about
July 1, 1947, obtained a substantial and considerable part of
the assets of the general partnership, the R. Verne McCullough
Enterprises, and consequently, therefore, that neither of the
corporations acquired all or substantially all of the assets of
the general partnership, the R. Verne McCullough E~terprises.
5
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DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT
NEITHER THE CANADA DRY BOTTLING COMPANY OF UTAH, A CORPORATION, NOR THE McCULLOUGH RECREATION COMPANY, A CORPORATION, WERE HQUALIFIED EMPLOYERS" WITHIN THE
MEANNG OF THE UTAH ACT ON JANUARY 1, 1947,
SINCE NEITHER ACQUIRED ALL OR SUBSTANTIALLY
ALL THE ASSETS OF THE PREDECESSOR EMPLOYER,
THE R. VERNE McCULLOUGH ENTERPRISES.
For some years prior to 1947 the Utah Employment Security
Act, Chapter 42-2a, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended,
contained no provision for reduced rates for employers "for the
purpose of paying unemployment compensation contributions.
The Act merely provided as follows:
Section 42-2a-7(b) (2), Utah Code Annotated 1943.
cc (b) (2)
Each employer shall pay contributions
equal to 2. 7 percent of wages paid by him during the
calendar year 1941 and durirtg each calendar year thereafter with respect to employment occurring after December 31, 1940."

Section 7 of the Act provided for a study of experience
rating.
The 1947 legislature enacted Chapter 56, Laws of Utah,
1947, providing two employer experience rating formulre.
Section 42-2a-7(b) was amended by adding:
cc ( 3) Each employer shall, except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, pay contributions equal to
2.7 percent of wages paid by him during the calendar

6
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years or portion thereof occurring after June 30, 1947,
and prior to January 1, 1950.
\\ ( 4) Each employer shall, except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, pay contributions equal to
2.7 percent of the wages paid by him during each of the
calendar years occurring after December 31, 1949."
The court's attention is called to the fact that ( 3) above
quoted provides for a _system of rates for the period commencing July 1, 1947, and ending December 31, 1949, and that ( 4)
provides for a system of rating to go into effect for the years
after December 31, 1949. The court's attention is called to
Chapter 53, Laws of Utah 1949, which, among other things,
amended Section 42-2a-7 by changing the above quoted paragraph (3) of subsection (b) to read as follows:
3) Each emplayer shall, except as provided· in
subsection (c) of this· section, pay contributions equal
to 2. 7 percent of wages paid by him during the calendar
years or portion thereof occurring after June 30, 1947."
t \

(

Paragraph ( 4) above quoted was deleted from the section
so that the system of rates, successorship, etc., which was
previously provided to take effect January 1, 1950, was deleted
from the Act, and the system as established in subsection (c) ,
with some amendments, remains in effect after December 31,
1949. The Act, therefore, establishes a standard rate for the
payment of contributions, ( 3) set out above, equal to 2. 7
percent of wages.
Section 42-2~-7 (c), Utah Code Annotated 1943, as
amended by Chapter 56, Laws of Utah, 1947, established a
formula whereby ((qualified employers" who met certain con7
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ditions set forth there would pay a rate less than 2. 7 percent.
(c) ( 1) (C) defined qualified employer as:
(C) 'Qualified employer' means any employer who:
was an employer as defined in this act during each of
the thirteen consecutive calendar quarters immediately
preceding the computation date; and had employment
in each of the three completed calendar years immediately preceding the computation date; and with
respect to such three calendar years had filed all contribution reports prescribed by the Commission; and
(except for amounts due as determined pursuant to
audit or as set forth on a notice of contribution deficiency prepared by the Commission and pertaining
to the quarter ending December 31 immediately preceding the computation date) had paid all contributions
thereon by the cut-off date. If an employer has acquired
all or substantially all the assets of another employer
and such other employer had discontinued operations
upon such acquisition, the period of liability of both
employers during such period shall be jointly considered_
for all purposes of this section."
tt

We find, therefore, that in order to have been classified
as a uqualified employer" so that the experience raing formula
would be applied as of July 1, 1947-the first rate reduction
applying only to the last six months Qf 1947-any employer
must ( 1) have been an employer as defined in the Act during
each of the 13 consecutive calendar quarters immediately
preceding the computation date (the first computation date
being January 1, 1947); (2) the employer must have had employment in each of the three completed calendar years immediately preceding the computation date; (3) the employer
with respect to such three calendar years must have filed all
contribution reports prescribed by the Commission; and ( 4)
8
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the employer must have paid all contributions thereon by the
cut-off date ( n (cut-off date' n1eans April 30 with respect to
contribution rates effective for the period July 1, 1947, to
December 31, 1947, and thereafter February 15 next following
the computation date,).
Or in the case where an employer acquired all or substantially all the assets o£ another employer, the period of liability
of both employers during the 13 consecutive calendar quarters
preceding the computation date, would be jointly considered
for all purposes of Section 7 provided it was shown that the
predecessor employer had discontinued operations upon such
acquisition.
It can be admitted that had the R. Verne McCullough
Enterprises, the general partnership, continued operations
during the rate period which commenced July 1, 1947, it
would have been a qualified employer and therefore would
have been entitled to a reduced rate computed on the basis of
the formula set out in the statute. (It is unnecessary to discuss
the formula inasmuch as the question of the method of its
application is not in issue in this matter. It appears to be
sufficient to state that rates are computed upon the basis of
the percentage decrease of annual payrolls over the 3-year
period; the percentage decrease of quarterly payrolls over the
3-year period; and the length of time the employer was subject
to the Act).
As in most cases where several distinct operating units
having their own records and payrolls were being operated by
one ownership, the general partnership operating units, the
Canada Dry Bottling Company of Utah, Temple Bowling
9
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Alleys, Ritz Bowling Palace, and Ogden Bowling· Center were
reported under teA" and tcB" accounts as follows:
The Temple Bowling Alleys, Ritz Bowling Palace, and
Ogden Bowling Center were reported under an teA" account
entitled R. Verne McCullough, et·al, dba R. Verne McCullough
Enterprises, and the Canada Dry Bottling Company of Utah
filed reports under a ~~B" account with the title R. Verne McCullough, et al. dba. Canada Dry Bottling Company of Utah .
. Had the general partnership continued operating during
the rate period commencing July 1, 1947, the total wages of all
of the operating units would have been combined and used in a
rate compu_tation in the manner set forth in Department's
Exhibit 5. Department's Exhibit 3 and 4 are computations
of rates which would have been applied to the two successor
corporations had they been ((qualified employers" within the
meaning of the above-quoted subsection (c) . The method
of computing rates is set forth in Department's Exhibit 2.
The computations as shown on the above-mentioned exhibits were made at the request of the appellants to determine
what rate would have been attributable to the general partnership, the R. Verne McCullough Enterprises, had it continued
operating after July 1, 1947, and what rate would have been
contributed to each of the two corporations had they been held
to be ((qualified employers." Under the ruling of the Department there had not been, prior to the date of the hearing in
this matter before the Referee, any rate computations affecting
these parties.
Some 38 states have passed statutes providing for the
transfer of merit rating to successors in certain cases. Of these,
10
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4 states have provided that an acquisition "of all or a part
thereof" was sufficient to establish successorship; 13 states
require an acquisition of Hsubstantially all"; and 18 states
allow successorship ·only if the trade, business, or nall" of the
assets of the predecessor were acquired.
The 1949 Legislature, Chapter 53, Laws of Utah 1949,
added to the above-quoted subsection ( 7) (c) the following
language:
ttl£ an employer has acquired a clearly segregable
and identifiable part of another employer's enterprise,
the period of liability attributable to such transferred
part of an employers' enterprise shall be considered
jointly with the period of liability of the acquiring
emplayer for_ all purposes of _this section, provided, that
the acquiring employer's rate for the period beginning
with the date of the transfer and ending with the next
following effective date of contribution rates shall be
that rate which is assigned pursuant to the regulations
of the Commission adopted under the provisions of
this section, which provide for the transfer of a rate
by an employer to his successor.

ttAn employer who transfers all or a segregable part
of his operations from another state to this state shall
be deemed to be a tqualified employer' within the
meaning of this section as of the computation date
next following the transfer, provided: that he has paid
wages subject to the federal unemployment tax act for
twelve consecutive completed calendar quarters immeditely preceding the computation date; that he
notifies the commission of the transfer of operations
prior to the computation date; that he certifies to the
Commission all information with respect to the transferred operations v;hich the Commission determines
to be necessary. (Wages,' paid in connection with such
11
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transferred operations shall be deemed to have been
paid in this state for the purposes of this section."
There can be no validity, however, in an argument that
this 1949 amendment was retroactive to July 1, 1947, and
the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 3rd Judicial
Department, on December 29, 1948, so held, in effect when
interpreting a similar amendment in ~he case of the Newspaper P.M., Inc., Marshall Field and Marshall Field, Jr., individually, doing business as Field Publications vs. Edward Corsi,
Industrial Commissioner (CCH N.Y. ~aragraph 8520.) The
court stated:
ttPrior to 1947 the requirements for qualification for
credit made no provision for and did not include an
employer's discontinuance of operations upon his disposal and another's consequent acquisition of a severable part of his business activities. That the equity
and fairness of so doing was recently recognized and
provided for (quoting New York Court, changes)
does not Fermit us to make that measure retroactive.
To uphold appellant's contention we would, in effect,
be doing that. The liberal construction contended for
would register the legislative grant of a new right
superfluous. The remedial nature of a new right bestowed affords it no retroactive reach. (Jacobus vs.
Colgate, 217 N. Y. 235) ."
The court held that Mr. Field, when he disposed of his
P.M. Newspaper business to the Field Publications and continued
the newspaper business of publishing the Chicago
Sun, and in connection therewith, continued in New York
City the maintenance of a news gathering and transmitting
organization, -did not discontinue operations within the meaning
of the applicable statute in 1942, the date of the transfer.

m

12
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We again call this court's attention to the fact that the
1947 Utah statute contained a similar provision that a successor
could not succeed to the experience of the predecessor unless
"such other employer had discontinued operations upon such
acquisition." (Sec. (7) (c).) It is our position that the Utah
statute establishes a standard rate of contributions of 2. 7 percent and that it is a well-settled principle of law that in order
. to take advantage of a statutory provision (for any reduction
in rate) the employer must prove to the satisfaction of the
administering body that it has met all of the statutory specifications. The statute is to be construed as written, having in
mind its evident purpose, whether the end result is considered
by some to be economically good or bad.
The statute, as it existed on July 1, 1947, was an integral
part of the statute just as is the 1949 amendment permitting
the transfer of merit rating in the case where an employer
acquires a clearly segregable and identifiable part of another
employer's enterprise. (55 Yale L. J. 218, 242). Also, there
can be no merit to the argument that the Canada Dry Bottling Company of Utah prior to its incorporation was a separate
employing unit or that the units which became incorporated
under the name McCullough Recreation Company were separate employing units.
Section 42-2a-19, Utah Code Annotated 1943, defines
employing unit as follows:
(h) (Employing unit' means any individual or type
of organization, including any partnership, association,
trust, estate, joint stock company, insurance company
or corporation, whether domestic or foreign, or the
receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, trustee or successor
u

13
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of any ·of the foregoing, or the legal representative
of a deceased person, which has or subsequent to
January 1, 1935, had one or pJore individuals performing services for it ·within this state.
(c (

1) All individuals performing services within this

· state for any employing unit which maintains two or
more separate establishments within this state shall
be deemed to be performing services for a single
employing unit for all the purposes of this act.
n (

2) Each individual employed to perform or to

assist in performing the work of any person in the
service of an employing unit shall be deemed to be
engaged by such employing unit for all the purposes
of this act whether such individual was hired or paid
directly by such employing unit or by such person,
provided the employing unit had actual or constructive
knowledge of the work."
Although this employer was allowed to file separate
reports for the different operating units, it was but one employing unit within the meaning of the above-quoted secti9n, that
unit being the R. Verne McCullough Enterprises, the general
partnership. As set forth in the above-quoted section, all of
the individuals performing services in the two or more separate
~~tablishments were deemed to be performing services for
the same employing unit, the R. Verne McCullough Enterprises.
4ny rate computations which would have been made would
ha:ve -been made on the basis of the combined payrolls of the
separate operating units .
.-. ;_ The New Hampshire Employment .Security Act prior
t9. April _30; 1945, contained no provision for the transfer of
experience rating, but effective April 30, 1945, the law was
am~nded to permit a transfer of rates. In the case of C. A.

14
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Lund & Company vs. Rolfe, 93 N. H. 280, 41 A. (2d) 226
( 1945) , dealing with the period prior to the amendment,
which became effective April 30, 1945, the court held that
a partnership which took over the business of the corporation
was not entitled to the merit rating record of the corporation
for purposes of computing the partnership's unemployment
compensation contribution rate even though the members of
the partnership consisted of 4 of the 6 stockholders of the
former corporation and no change in personnel or type of
business conducted took place at the time the partnership
took over the business of the corporation.
The New Hampshire court further held, in the case of
Sulloway, et al vs. Rolfe, 47 A. (2d) 109 (1946), that where
a member of a partnership died and was replaced by a new
member, a new employing unit was thereby created and there.fore such employing unit was not entitled to pay unemployment
compensation contributions at a rate based upon the combined
experience of it and its predecessor even though the partner
had agreed that irt the event of death or resignation of any
partner, the remaining partners would continue the practice
of law together as partners and that the partnership should
not terminate because of such death or resignation.
In the case of Seavey Hardware Company vs. Riley, 95
N. H .... , 67 A. (2d) 430, decided June 28, 1949, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court held that a purchaser of one of
two hardware stores owned by a partnership was not entitled
to the merit rating of the partnership under the Unemployment
Compensation Law since the store purchased did not constitute substantially all of the assets of the partnership. The

15'
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court overruled the contention that the partnership comprised
two employing units and that each of them was an employer
under the law ... In answer to the contention of the plaintiff that
the partnership comprised two employing units, one the Seavey
Hardware Company, and the other Young's Hardware Store,
and that each of these units was itself an ctemployer" under
the Act, the court said:
nThis argument ignores the express provision contained in subsection 1-G: (All individuals performing
services within this state for any employing unit which
· maintains two or more separate establishments withinthe state shall be deemed to be employed by a single
employing unit for all purposes of this chapter.' The
Fountain partnership, although it had two sepa~ate
stores or establishments in Dover and Exeter respectively, was a single employing unit and so one
employer. Cartersville Candlewick vs. Huiet, 50 S. E.
( 2d) (Ga.) 647. It is clear that the terms of subsection
1-G in the definition of an employing unit expressly
include a partnership and neither expressly nor by
implication refer to a store in and of itself as an employing unit. The Dover store itself was not an employing unit or employer within the meaning of the
Act -and had no merit rating that could be acquired
by Thomas C. Dunnington.
nThe plaintiff's position is fallacious in stating that
the Seavey Hardv1are Company was one employing
unit and that the other was Young's Hardware Store.
Employing unit is defined in terms of the individual or
type of organization behind a trade or business rather
than in terms of the physical units and the economic
features of the enterprise. In Sulloway vs. Rolfe,
supra, 87, the theory that an employing unit was the
same because the organization of a certain law office
was the same and it was fair to say that there was iden-

16
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tity of enterprise and other business and economic
factors, was rejected. It was held that since there was
a change in the personnel of the partnership, the employing unit was new and that under the statute as
it then was, the new partnership was not entitled to
the merit rating of the predecessor. So, in the present
case the contention that the Dover Store was an employing unit, cannot be accepted. The employing unit
was the Fountain partnership, which also owned the
store in Exeter.. It has sometimes been stated that the
phrase (employing unit' is defined in terms of the
venturer rather than of the venture. By employing
unit is meant the master rather than the servants, the
owner rather than the business, the one ultimately
liable for the obligations of the organizations.

ttThe claim of the plaintiff that the defendant (should
have divided Fountain's account into two sections, one
applicable to each establishment,' is error. The statute
provides for a separate account for each employer and
accordingly for a separate rating for each . . . These
merit rating accounts are not severable, nor can a part
of the trccount of the transferor be carried forward by
the successor. Cartersville Candlewick vs. Huiet, supra;
Ned's Auto Supply ·company vs. Commission, 313
Mich. 66; El Queeno Distributing Company vs.
Christgau, 221 Minn. 197. The accounts and ratings
cannot be multiplied to correspond to the severable
portions of an employer's organization, trade, or business, either during his ownership or at the time of
acquisition of a portion by another or others. If the
requirements of subsection 6-F are complied with, the
successor gains the merit rating of the transferor.
Otherwise, he gets no such rating with his transfer.
The Act does not contemplate the great burden that
would be cast upon the defendant by holding that
accounts should correspond to establishments rather
than to employers. Also, no provision is made for
17
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dividing a merit rating at the time of the acquisition
of a part of the assets of an employer so that two shall
. be created out of the one that existed . . . For each
business, account and merit rating, there is but one
.employer although he may operate more than one
establishment; for each employer, only one set of
contributions as required."
(The court then proceeded to set out the definition of
employing unit, which corresponds to the definition of employing unit in the Utah ~ct).
Similarly, under the Utah Act, there is in the instant case
only a single employer, the R. Verne McCullough Enterprises,
a gen~ral partnership, which, until the time of the incorporation
_on or about July 1, 1947, had one account and one merit rate
(or would have had a merit rate had it continued in operation
after July 1, 1947).
It is a matter of historical record that Section ( 7) (c) of
the statute, and particularly that portion defining a ((qualified
employer," hereinabove quoted, was copied verbatim from
the New Yotk statute as it existed at the time of the 1947
legislative amendment. It is also true that since the Utah
statute established a method of reduced rates for employers
a number of years after most of the other states had expet.~.enced
a rate reduction, we are compelled to rely upon decisions of
those other states in interpreting similar provisions in the Utah
Act. The New York Act provided:
HI£ an employer has acquired all or substantially all
the assets of another employer and such other employer
has discontinued operations on such acquisition, the
period of liability of both employers during such period
18
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shall be jointly considered for all purposes of this
section.''
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division 3rd
Department, 275, Appellate Division 881, decided May 4,
1949, held that a corporation which was engaged in the manufacture of radio and telephone parts and which operated a laboratory and a patent division in connection therewith and which
transferred to one of its subsidiaries all of the assets used in connection 'vith its laboratory division and retained the assets used
in connection with its patent division was held not entitled to
transfer its contribution rate to such successor. Although the
corporation transferred substantially all of its assets, it failed
to discontinue business operations and thus failed to comply
with at least one condition necessary to permit the transfer
of its rate credit. The court said:
The legislature did not intend to authorize the
transfer of credits allowed to a qualified employer to
anyone except his successor in business who had acquired all or substantially all of his assets, and then
only if the qualified employer had ceased all business
operations."
tt

•••

So that this court rnay understand the term transfer of
credits," the New York statute sets up a procedure whereby
at the end of a rate year the employer is given a credit or cash
refund which will, of course, be applied on future contributions, etc. The Utah Act does not provide for extra credits.
It provides that in the succeeding year the qualified employer
will pay a rate less than 2.7 percent. So also did the New
York court rule in the case of the Matter of the Application
for a Contribution Rate Credit Under Section 577 of the
't
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Unemployment Insurance Law· by Hinzmann and Waldmann,
Inc., .Appellant vs. Edward Corsi, Industrial Commissioner,
decided December 29, 1948, 274 App. Div. 1009. In this
case the court decided that the appellant, one of two corporations formed to take the business of a partnership,. did not
acquire substantially all of the assets of the former partnership
venture where the total assets of the partnership at the time
of the transfer were $523,117.89 and the appellant acquired
only. $129,938.98, and therefore that the appellant was not
entitled to a tax credit for the year in which the transfer took
place. The only question which was presented in that case
was the one as to whether or not the appellant was a ((qualified
employer" as defined in the New York Act. Briefly, the facts
were ·as follows:
For some time prior to April, 1946, Albert 0. Hinzmann
and Anton Waldmann, as co-partners, were engaged in business
as joiners and woodworkers. In addition to that venture, the
partners, commencing November, -1944, and continuing until
April, 1946, engaged in the business of repairing ships. In
April, 1946, the partners determined to incorporate their business and form two corporations for that purpose. The appellant· is one of the two corporations, and the partnership
transferred to it that portion of the partnership assets carried
on the partnership books as the woodworking assets. The
portion of the business relating to the ship repairing was
transferred to a corporation kno-yvn as the Hinzmann & Waldmann Marine Corporation. The section of the New York Law
which was involved was the one hereinbefore set forth dealing
with the acquisition of the assets of another employer. Hinzmann and Waldmann, Inc., filed a motion for leave to appeal
20
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from the above decision. These defendants are advised by
the State of New York that after consideration of the briefs
filed pursuant to the motion for leave to appeal, the motion
was denied.
So, in the instant case, neither the Canada Dry Bottling
Company of Utah, a corporation, nor the McCullough Recreation Company, a corporation, acquired substantially all of the
assets of the general partnership, the R. Verne McCullough
Enterprises, and neither did they acquire a rna jority of the
assets.
In a very recent case decided by the New Hampshire
Supreme Court on November 1, 1949, Auclair Transportation,
Inc., vs. William Riley, Comml.ssioner of Labor, it was held
that a corporation which was formed to take over the business
of a trucking company was not entitled to the predecessor.
employer's reduced rate where substantially all of the predecessor's assets were not transferred to the successor corporation.
The court said:
tcThe relation between the value of the trucking
business transferred and the value of the gasoline station retained is not so small from either an accounting
or practical viewpoint that we can say as a matter of
law that substantially all of the assets of the business
. . . were acquired by the plaintiff.''
In the Auclair case the facts. were that W .. M. Auclair
owned and operated a motor vehicle trucking business, doing
business as W. M. Auclair Transportation, and also operated
a gasoline station for the sale of gasoline and allied products.
In the trucking business he employed approximately 25 persons,
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and in the gasoline station he generally had 3 employees. The
book value of the trucking business was set up at some $34,000
and the book value of the gasoline station was set up at some
$4,000. He transferred the trucking operation on January 1,
1945, to the Auclair Transportation, Inc. He retained possession and ownership of the gasoline station and continued
·to operate the same. The court said:
"The issue in this case is whether the plaintiff is
·entitled to the employer merit rating of W. M. Auclair
upon the transfer described in the agreed facts. The
unemployment compensation statute provides that the
· experience rating of an employer may be transferred
to (an employing unit which acquires the organization,
trade, or business, or substantially all the assets thereof

ccwe are not concerned with the logical and economic
questions for and against experience rating or merit
rating as it is usually described in this state (55 Yale
L. J. 218, 242) , since it is an integral part of the
statute. Following the decisions in the Lund vs. Rolfe,
93 N.H. 280, and Sulloway vs. Rolfe, 94 N.H. 85,
the quoted statute also made the transfer of merit
rating for unemployment compensation contribution to
successor employing units (Note 60 Harv. L. Rev. 276)
an integr~l part of the law."
The court further said:
C(The word (substantially' is merely an elastic term
which does not indicate a definite fixed amount of
percentage. At one extreme it may be said that the
transfer does not have to be 100 percent; at the other
extreme, it may be said that the transfer cannot be less
than 90 percent in the ordinary situation. (See application of Hinzmann & Waldmann, 85 N.Y. S. 149;
Schul· Trading Company vs. Commission, 95 F. (2d)
22
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404), although a lesser amount has been considered
sufficient under a statute which is broader than ours.
Harris vs. Egan, 135 Conn. 102; anno: 4 A. L. R. 2d
721. The relation between the value of the trucking
business transfer and the value of the gasoline station
retained is not so small from either an accounting or
practical viewpoint that we can say, as a matter of law,
that substantially all of the assets of the business of
W. M. Auclair were acquired by the plaintiff. The
determination by the defendant that they were not is
one that could be made upon the facts in this case."
The plaintiffs, in their brief, (Page 18) refer to the case
of Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. vs. Iowa Employment Security
Commission ,Supreme Court of Iowa. An examination of the
Iowa statute shows that the provision in question was as
follows:
Hb. In any case in which the enterprise or business for
which contributions have been paid has been sold or
otherwise transferred to a successor employing unit,
or in any case in which one or more employing units
have been reorganized or merged into a single employing unit and the successor employer continues to operate
such enterprise, such successor employer shall assume
the position of the predecessor employer or employers
with respect to such predecessor's payrolls, contributions, accounts, and contribution rates to the same extent as if there had been no change in the ownership
or control of such enterprise or business.''
It is noted that the Iowa statute differs materially from
the Utah statute in that it is concerned primarily with whether
or not the employing unit or units which were transferred are
operated as a- single employing unit. The rationale behind
the law can be readily understood since in that state the
employer experience rate is based upon the amount of benefits

23
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

which are paid· to individuals formerly in its employ, which
benefits are charged against -the employer's account. In cases
where one ownership operates several units, the benefit-charges··
would have been made against the single ownership, and not
agai11st . th_e individual employing units. Consequently, it
would have been impossible for the Iowa Agency to have determirted charges against individual units at a later date when
such individual units might have been transf~rred to different
successors; and therefore it would not have been possible to
determine what rate should be applicable to an individual
operating unit.
So, too, under the Utah Act the legislature had in mind
that an employing unit in Utah may have become subject to
the Utah Act and have operated three or more years. This
single ownership of a single operating unit may have acquired
one or more new business units which had no operating experi·ence.. It can be easily seen, therefore, that upon segregation
only the individual operating unit which had three or more
ye~~s .of ~overage would have had sufficient expenence to
comply_ with the three-year requirement.
_It- will be noted that the Utah Act also carries a statutory
requirement that no employer may obtain a rate less than 2.7
percent (the standard rate) unless he had paid all contributions due and has filed all reports. The Pennsylvania statute
COJ?,tains a ·similar provision, and the Court· of Common Pleas
of Dauphin County (No. 2 Commonwealth Docket 1948)
in the case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania vs. Molnar
Brothers Coal Company from the order of Department of
Labor and Industry on the Application for Review and Re-
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adjustment of the Contribution Rate to the Unemployment
Compensation Fund, decided March, 1949, that where the
predecessor had not paid all contributions, the successor was
not entitled to a reduced rate. The court said:
HThe appellant does not deny its failure to comply
with the provisions of the law, but attempts first to
excuse its failure on the ground that the Bureau would
not help it make out its returns until1947 and, secondly,
contends that the provision of paragraph Ce' is in the
nature of a penalty and as such is unreasonable and
unlawful . . .
HWhere the appellant falls into error on its other
contention is that the tax imposed by the statute is 2. 7
percent and not the unknown and undetermined percent which the appellant would be required to pay had
it been entitled to an experience rating.
uln Albright Unemployment Compensation case, 162
Pa. Superior Ct. 98, 104 ( 1948) Judge Arnold said:
(Prior to 1943 intervenor's tax was 2. 7DJo. uExperience rating'' effected, according to a formula, and
adjustment of the contribution, which reduced this
rate, the reduction to become greater as the ccunemployment'' of the employer's workmen became less.
It was a reward and not a penalty, for without ccexperience rating" the employer's tax would remain at
2.7DJo, and in the subsequent amendments of 1943
and 1945 its tax was fixed at this rate unless adjusted.'
"As pointed out above the tax is 2.7DJo unless the taxpayer meets certain requirements among which is the
payment of all contributions prior to certain prescribed
dates which the appellant did not do.
uBeing ca reward and not a penalty' the principles
relating to penalties urged upon us by the appellant
25
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do not apply. The rate was properly set by the Bureau
for 1947 at 2. 70jo."

CONCLUSION
In conclusion the defendants in the instant case contend
that the plaintiffs have not met the statutory requirements for
the payment of a rate less than 2.7 percent-the standard rate
established by the statute-and that, therefore, their rate for
the period involved in this matter must remain at 2. 7 percent.
Respectfully submitted,

CLINTON D. VERNON
Attorney General
FRED F. DREMANN, Special
Assistant Attorney General
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